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One thing that has been assumed for a long time is that whenever there
is dominant strategy equilibrium in the game form of any mechanism and
the outcome corresponding to that strategy pro￿le is socially optimal,
people will play that particular equilibrium strategy pro￿le. The theory
has been silent on why they will play that particular strategy pro￿le when
there are other (Nash) equilibria. The Nash/Bayes￿Nash implementation
being a possible solution to this problem su⁄ers from the drawback of
either the requirement of the designer knowing the (common) prior (in
case of Bayes￿Nash implementation) or the requirement of the players
predicting the actions of other players and collaborate without pre-talk
(in case of Nash implementation with absence of dominant strategy or
unique Nash).
Secure implementation [Saijo et al. (2007)] is a relatively new concept
in the theory of mechanism design and implementation. This requires
double implementation in Dominant Strategy Equilibrium and Nash Equi-
librium by the same Mechanism. This concept has worked well in some
particular environments and has been tested on data [Cason et al. (2006)].
Unsurprisingly, being stronger than both the two above said concepts of
implementation, there are many impossibility results in speci￿c environ-
ments with richer domains. We look for secure implementability in pro-
duction economies with divisible goods. We ￿nd that a very broad gener-
alization of "Serial" Social Choice Function (SCF) [Moulin and Shenker
(92)] as de￿ned in [Shenker (92)] is securely implementable. We call such
functions as Generalized Serial SCF (GSS). We also ￿nd that under cer-
tain conditions the Fixed Path SCFs are special cases of GSS and thus
they are also securely Implementable. We conjecture that these are the
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1only securely implementable SCFs in our environment if we add a few
desirable axioms.
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1 Introduction
We consider the standard implementation problem where an outcome has to
be chosen from a set of alternatives depending upon the characteristics (e.g.,
preferences) of the agents in the society. The rule which chooses this outcome
based on the true preference pro￿le1 (or any other such characteristic2) of the
agents is called a Social Choice Function (SCF). The problem of implementing
this rule arises because the above said "characteristics of the agents" may be
private information of these agents and it may not be in their best interest to
reveal these true characteristics if they know how the outcome is going to be
chosen based on their reports. To achieve the goal of implementing a SCF it
may be the case that the agents are directly asked to report their preferences
or they may be asked to indulge in an indirect process where they interact
under certain rules. In both the cases the institution which is used creates a
game amongst the agents. These institutions are called mechanisms or game
forms. The case where agents are required to report their preferences directly
and the outcome is chosen according the SCF is called direct mechanism. The
other one is called indirect mechanism. Strategyproofness of direct mechanisms
is a requirement on the mechanism that truth telling by each agent leads to
a most favorable outcome for that agent, no matter what the other agents
are reporting. In other words, truth-telling is a dominant strategy equilibrium
under the mechanism if the mechanism is strategyproof. It seems natural that
players will reveal the truth if it is dominant strategy to do so. However, the
performance of strategyproof mechanisms in achieving socially desired goals has
been in question for a long time. On the one hand, a sequence of experiments
show that pivotal mechanisms3 fail to get the truth telling as a unique outcome
(see Attiyeh et al. [2], Kawagoe and Mori [16], etc ). On the other hand,
there are experiments which show that true valuation is not revealed by the
subjects in second price auction4 experiments ( see Kagel et al. [13], Kagel and
Levin [14] ). Some experimentalists argue that the subjects who don￿ t play their
dominant strategy must be confused by the complexity of the mechanisms where
the dominant strategy may not be that clear. But neither epistemic(Aumann
1A preference pro￿le is a set of preferences ￿one for each agent.
2In our framework, the characteristics of the agents we are considering are their preferences.
But, more generally it can be the agents￿endowments, the agents￿abilities (e.g. production
technology) etc.
3Pivotal mechanisms are strategyproof mechanisms in the problem of provision of public
goods
4Second price auction is another example of strategyproof mechanism where the highest
bidder gets the object and pays the highest losers bid. Others pay nothing.
2and Brandenburger [1] ) nor evolutive(Hurwicz [12], Smith [27] ) models of game
theory provide unambiguous support for the elimination of weakly dominated
strategies. In fact the only prediction that is supported in these models is that
the outcome must be a Nash Equilibrium (NE).
This leads us to think of two problems associated with strategyproof mecha-
nisms. First, truth-telling may not be an agent￿ s unique dominant strategy and
using wrong dominant strategy may lead to wrong outcomes. Second, there
can be NE other than the dominant strategy equilibrium which lead to wrong
outcomes. To see this problem, consider a simple example of pivotal mechanism
for two players. Suppose there is a costless public project to be undertaken if
and only if the sum of the (reported) valuations of the project by the two agents
is non negative. It is well known since Clarke [4] that the transfers according
to pivotal mechanism5 induce truth telling as a dominant strategy equilibrium.
It is fairly easy to see that no one can gain by reporting anything other than
the true value irrespective of what the other is reporting. However, the true
pro￿le is not the only NE. As a matter of fact, as is demonstrated in ￿gure 1
below, almost half of the two dimensional Euclidian space constitute the set of
NE. Here, the axes represent the type (valuation) space of the agents and since
the pivotal mechanism is a direct mechanism they also represent the strategy
space of the agents. Notice that the area which correspond to the set of NE
(the shaded area) has two regions. In the ￿rst region (which is shaded green),
the corresponding outcome is socially desired. However, there exists another re-
gion (which is shaded yellow) of the similar size where the NE leads to outcome
which is not socially desired.
Secure implementation (Saijo et al. [25] ) is one way to remedy this prob-
lem faced by the strategyproof mechanisms. Secure implementation of a SCF
requires the existence of a mechanism under which there is a dominant strategy
equilibrium which leads to the socially desired outcome and all the NE under the
mechanism also lead to the socially desired outcome. This mode of implementa-
tion has been tested on data and has been found to be performing signi￿cantly
better than strategyproof mechanisms under the presence of multiple NEs (
Cason et al. [5] ). This nice property of secure implementation doesn￿ t come
without costs. In many environments there doesn￿ t exist non trivial SCFs which
are securely implementable. Following are some of the examples.
Consider a public good provision problem where the good must be provided
if and only if the sum of valuations is non-negative. We have just seen above
that the pivotal mechanism doesn￿ t securely implement this SCF. Notice that
this SCF is e¢ cient i.e. it maximizes the social surplus. It has been shown in
theorem 7 in ( Saijo et al. [25] ) that there doesn￿ t exist any surplus maximizing
SCF which can be securely implementable6. This negative result of incompati-
5A transfer ti to agent i according to pivotal mechanism in this environment will be equal
to the ￿jvjj if agent i is pivotal i.e. absence of agent i would have changed the decision of
undertaking the social project. Here, vk is the valuation of agent k for the public project. In
other words, If the presence of an agent alters the outcome in her favor, she must compensate
the others for their (revealed) welfare loss.
6This result is valid even when the consider multivalued Social Choice Correspondences
3bility between surplus-maximizing and secure implementation in the quasilinear
environment7 with discrete social decision is further illustrated by the second
price auction where a large set of NE correspond to the non-surplus-maximizing
outcome8. To see this point, consider a two player example where the valuation
for the object to be auctioned are ￿1 and ￿2 by agent 1 and agent 2 respectively.
Suppose, ￿1 > ￿2 > 0. In order to maximize the total surplus, it must be the
case that object is allocated to agent 1. But, as we see in ￿gure 2 below, the
set of NE is quite large. The lower right set of NE correspond to the surplus
maximizing outcome whereas the upper left set of NE end up allocating the
object to agent 2.
Figure 1: Equilibria of the pivotal mechanism
Another environment is where the social decision is a continuous variable but
there are no transfers involved. Consider a single-peaked voting environment
where the set of alternatives is A = [0;1] and set of possible preferences are
those that are continuous and single-peaked9 on A: In such an environment one
can ￿nd nice SCFs which are strategyproof such as the median voter rule10.
Median voter rule enjoys nice properties like pareto-e¢ ciency, non-dictatorship,
non-bossiness apart from strategyproofness (in fact, group-strategyproofness).
(SCC) in place of SCFs.
7Quasilinear preferences are represented by utility function which is additive and linear in
one commodity called money.
8Surplus maximization here means that the private good to be auctioned must be allocated
to the agent with the highest valuation.
9Single-peaked preferences requires the existence of a point p(ui) for each i called the
peak of agent i with preference ui such that ui is strictly increasing before p(ui) and strictly
decreasing after p(ui).
10Median voter rule picks the median of {p(ui)}i2N given a pro￿le u.
4However, this rule is not securely implementable. Similarly, other well known-
known rules, such as the one which picks the smallest of the peaks, are not
securely implementable. As a matter of fact, it has been shown in theorem
8 of ( Saijo et al. [25] ) that only rules which are securely implementable in
this environment are the dictatorial rules. If we relax the rule and allow it be
multivalued then we can get non-dictatorial rules but they can not be pareto-
e¢ cient.
Figure 2: Equilibria of the second-price auction
There are more recent negative results. Bochet and Sakai [3] show that in
allotment economies the securely implementable rules are either e¢ cient (pri-
ority rules) or symmetric (equal division) but not both. They also show that in
"uniform rule" bad Nash Equilibria can be avoided but for that we need to allow
for pre play talk among the players which is a di⁄erent set up of implementation
in itself. Fujinaka and Wakayama [11] show that in an economy with indivisible
objects and money, the only securely implementable rules are the constant rules.
The above examples show how di¢ cult it is to ￿nd securely implementable
rules which have other nice properties. However, there are environments where
securely implementable rules do exist. For example, such environments are
found in quasilinear setup where the social decision is a continuous variable. It
has been shown in Saijo et al. [25] that serial SCF ( Moulin and Shenker [22] ) is
securely implementable in the one input one output production economy with
convex cost technology. We look for other possible SCFs which are securely
implementable in such environments. We ￿nd out that it is not just the serial
SCF which is securely implementable but a class of SCFs called generalized
5serial SCFs (GSS) de￿ned in ( Shenker [26] ) are also securely implementable
when the technology has convex cost.
The generalized serial SCFs are described for production economies with
smooth production technologies. By smooth production technology we mean
that the feasible consumption bundle must lie on some smooth manifold in
Rm. Each agent reports his utility function which is de￿ned over Rm
+ and is
non-decreasing, continuous, locally non-satiated and quasi-concave. Then, the
mechanism allocates the set of feasible bundles corresponding to the unique NE
of an underlying game. The GSS are more general than other generalizations of
Serial Mechanism whose incentive properties have been studied in the literature.
Among these are the Fixed Path Methods (FPM) where the share of total cost
paid by an agent is decided by a path in Rn
+ where n is the number of agents.
This path does not depend on the demand vector. We ￿nd out that under some
assumptions on the cost functions and on the preferences (which guarantee the
desired incentive properties of such methods), the FPMs are in fact special cases
of GSS and thus all such FPMs are securely implementable. However, there are
GSS which can not be represented as Fixed Path Methods. We conjecture that
if we require the mechanism to be non-constant, symmetric (anonymous) and
smooth then GSS are the only mechanisms which are securely implementable.
At this point, it is very important to note the intuition why the serial SCF
(or more generally the GSS) have such nice incentive property of secure imple-
mentability whereas, as we will discuss later, the SCF corresponding to other
well known cost sharing rules like the Aumann-Shapley rule (which is the pro-
portional rule in homogeneous goods case) does not share this feature11. In
the latter, by changing the report an agent can a⁄ect the outcome for all the
agents simultaneously. In particular, that agent￿ s report changes the outcomes
of such agents whose report in turn can change his outcome. This severe na-
ture of externality in such SCF violates the acyclicity condition necessary for
the combination of non-bossiness and strategyproofness ( see Satterthwaite and
Sonnenschein [29] ) of the SCF which in turn is necessary for secure imple-
mentability. Under the serial SCF, on the contrary, the protection of lower
demanders12 from the demands of the higher demanders makes the externality
one sided which is not that severe. More precisely, a change in the report of
low demander changes the outcomes for all the high demanders whereas small
change in the report of high demanders doesn￿ t a⁄ect the outcome for the lower
demanders.
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows. In section 2 we precisely in-
troduce the notion of secure implementability and give one proposition which
characterizes the securely implementable SCFs. In section 3 we de￿ne the serial
cost sharing method and introduce some generalizations considered in literature
with special focus on the ones whose strategic properties have been studied. In
11The SCF corresponding to the Aumann-Shapley rule is not even strategyproof
12By low demander in homogeneous case we mean an agent who gets smaller share of the
output and pays lower level of input as the ￿nal outcome of the SCF. In heterogeneous case, all
the generalizations of serial mechanism rank the agents in an order based on di⁄erent criteria.
6section 4 we de￿ne serial SCF and GSS and in section 5 we present two of our
main results. The main proofs are gathered in the appendix A.
2 Secure implementability
We consider an arbitrary set of alternatives A and a ￿nite set of agents N =
f1;2;:::;ng , where n ￿ 2. Typical agents are represented by alphabets i; j
etc. The preference relation of agent i over the set A is represented by utility
function ui. The set of admissible utility functions for agent i is denoted by
Ui:The cartesian product of U1;U2;::::;Un is represented by U i.e. U ￿ ￿
i2N
Ui.
A typical element of U is a utility pro￿le u = (u1;::::un) which is an n-tuple of
utility functions￿one for each agent. A social choice function (SCF) f : U ! A;
is a function that associates with every u 2 U a unique alternative f(u) in A.
A mechanism (or a game form) g : S ! A is a function that assigns to every
s 2 S a unique element of A, where S ￿ ￿
i2N
Si and Si is the strategy space of
agent i.
De￿nition 1 The mechanism g is called a direct revelation mechanism asso-
ciated with the SCF f if Si = Ui for all i 2 N and g(u) = f(u) for all
u 2 U:
Some times we may refer a direct revelation mechanism as the SCF if
no confusion arises. When the strategies of agents j 6= i is ￿xed at s￿i ￿
(s1;s2;::;si￿1;si+1;:::;sn), agent i can induce certain outcomes by choosing
strategies from the set Si. The set of such outcomes denoted by g(Si;s￿i) is
called the attainable set or the opportunity set of agent i at s￿i. More for-
mally, g(Si;s￿i) ￿ fb 2 Aj9si 2 Si s.t.g(si;s￿i) = bg. The set of alternatives
that agent i with utility ui ranks weakly below the alternative a 2 A is called
the weak lower contour set for agent i with utility ui at a and is denoted by
L(a;ui). More formally, L(a;ui) ￿ fb 2 Ajui(a) ￿ ui(b)g. Given the mecha-
nism g : S ! A, the strategy pro￿le s 2 S is a Nash Equilibrium (NE) of g at
u 2 U if 8i 2 N , g(Si;s￿i) ￿ L(g(s);ui). Let￿ s denote by Ng(u) the set of
Nash equilibria of g at u.
De￿nition 2 The mechanism g implements f in Nash equilibria if for all u 2
U , (i) 9 s 2 Ng(u) st. g(s) = f(u) and (ii) 8s 2 Ng(u); g(s) = f(u):
The SCF f is Nash implementable if there exists a mechanism that imple-
ments f in Nash equilibria. Given the mechanism g : S ! A, the strategy pro￿le
s 2 S is a Dominant strategy Equilibrium of g at u 2 U if 8i 2 N,8~ s￿i 2 S￿i,
g(Si; ~ s￿i) ￿ L(g(si; ~ s￿i);ui): Let￿ s denote by DSg(u) the set of dominant strat-
egy equilibria of g at u.
De￿nition 3 The mechanism g implements f in Dominant Strategy equilibria
if for all u 2 U , (i) 9 s 2 DSg(u) st. g(s) = f(u) and (ii) 8s 2 DSg(u);
g(s) = f(u):
7The SCF f is Dominant Strategy implementable if there exists a mechanism
that implements f in Dominant Strategy equilibria. We now introduce formally
the concept of secure implementation which requires the existence of a mecha-
nism which implements the the SCF in Nash equilibria as well as in Dominant
Strategy equilibria.
De￿nition 4 The mechanism g securely implements the SCF f if for all u 2 U
, (i) 9 s 2 DSg(u) st. g(s) = f(u) and (ii) 8s 2 Ng(u); g(s) = f(u):
The SCF f is securely implementable (SI) if there exists a mechanism that
securely implements f. Strategyproofness is a requirement on a SCF that
truth telling by the agents is a dominant strategy under the direct revela-
tion mechanism. More formally, the SCF f satis￿es strategy proofness (SP)
if, 8u 2 U;8i 2 N;8e ui 2 Ui;ui(f(u)) > ui(f(~ ui;u￿i)). Another technical
property on the SCF, introduced in Saijo e.t. al. [25], which together with
strategyproofness characterizes secure implementability is called rectangularity
property and is de￿ned as following. The SCF f satis￿es the rectangularity prop-
erty (RP) if for all u; ~ u 2 U; if ui(f(~ ui; ~ u￿i)) = ui(f(ui; ~ u￿i)) for all i 2 N;then
f(~ u) = f(u): The following characterization due to Saijo e.t. al. [25] will be
used in one of our main results.
Proposition 1 (Saijo e.t. al. [25]): A SCF f is Securely Implementable
if and only if f satis￿es Strategyproofness and Rectangularity Property.
3 Serial Cost Sharing Methods
Serial cost sharing method was ￿rst introduced for an environment where the
goods demanded by the agents are homogeneous or, in other words, the agents
demand various quantities of the same good. Since our purpose here is to
extend this method to more general settings, we will de￿ne the problem in an
environment where each agent i 2 N demands qi 2 [0;qmax] ￿ R+ quantity13
a personalized14 good i. Thus qi, the ith component of vector q 2 RN
+ ,can
be thought of as the demand for good i as well as the demand of agent i.
The cost of serving these demands is C(q), which must be divided among the
agents; the cost share of agent i is given by xi(q;C). The preferences of agent
i is de￿ned over R2 which is continuous, increasing in qi, decreasing in xi and
the upper contour set is convex15. Let a concave utility function ui(qi;xi)
represent the preference of agent i. Recall that for the homogeneous goods case
C(q) = C(qN) where, qN =
P
i2N qi. Here the serial cost sharing method is
de￿ned as follows. Consider, Without loss of generality q1 ￿ q2 ￿ :::: ￿ qn.
De￿ne, qi = (q1;q2;:::;qi￿1;qi;qi;:::;qi) then ,
13qmax can be 1
14In some of the more general models e.g., [17], [15], each agent may demand quantities of
some or all of the goods.
15An special case which is widely studied in this framework is the preference which is
quasilinear in xi and concave in qi:
8xi(q;C) =
C(qi)





(n + 1 ￿ k)(n ￿ k)
(1)
This method works as follows. Agent 1, with the lowest demand q1 pays 1=n
th of the cost of nq1. Agent 2, with the second lowest demand pays agent 1￿ s
cost share, plus 1=(n ￿ 1)th of the incremental cost from nq1 to q1 + (n ￿ 1)q2.
Agent 3, with the next lowest demand pays agent 2￿ s cost share, plus 1=(n￿2)
th of the incremental cost from q1 + (n ￿ 1)q2 to q1 + q2 + (n ￿ 2)q3. And so
on. This method is characterized by "anonymity" and "invariance of the cost
share of low demanders by a change in the demand of high demanders". The
demand game generated by this method is as follows. Each agent has a strategy
(demand) space which is R+ and his cost share as a function of the demand
pro￿le is computed by (1). The payo⁄ is given by the utility function de￿ned
above. It should be noted that the serial cost sharing method (1) is de￿ned
for any arbitrary cost function. However, if we assume the cost function to be
strictly16 convex (increasing marginal costs), then this demand game has very
strong strategic properties. In this demand game the NE is unique, robust to
coalitional deviations and the only rationalizable strategy pro￿le. Moreover,
this NE is the unique outcome of adaptive learning (Milgrom and Roberts, [19]
).
Given the nice strategic and equity properties that the serial method en-
joys in homogeneous good setting, it is natural to look for the extension for
the rule in more general settings. In particular, a natural question is what the
counterpart of the serial method in heterogeneous good (multidimensional) case
will be. Among the various approaches to extend the Serial Mechanism to the
case of heterogeneous goods, it is a general consensus ( Koplin [15], Koster et
al. [17], Sprumont [28], Friedman [7], Friedman and Moulin [9] etc.) that the
mechanism must coincide with the Serial Mechanism in the homogeneous case.
This property is referred to as serial extension. But, the task of extending the
serial mechanism to heterogenous goods case is not an easy one as was ￿rst
demonstrated by Koplin [15]. He shows using a nice counterexample that serial
extension is not compatible with other desired properties namely consistency
(he calls it direct aggregation invariance), scale invariance and additivity each
of which is compelling in its own sense. Consistency is the requirement from the
cost sharing method that the cost shares be invariant if we relabel the commodi-
ties. Scale invariance requires that the units in which the goods are measured
does not a⁄ect the cost shares. Additivity is a decentralizability axiom which
says that if we can separate the production into di⁄erent processes, then we
should be able to apply the same cost sharing method in each process and the
still get the same cost shares. Therefore, knowing that we can not be too de-
manding with respect to serial extension there have been di⁄erent approaches
to pin down the class of methods which carry on the properties of serial method
16strictness is not needed if the preferences of the agents are strictly convex.
9for homogeneous methods to the heterogeneous goods environment. These ap-
proaches can be broadly categorized into two groups￿one which focusses on
axiomatic approach ( Koster et al. [17], Sprumont [28]) and the other which is
concerned about the strategic properties ( Friedman [7], Friedman and Moulin
[9], Friedman [8]).
Since we are more interested in the strategic properties, we analyze the sec-
ond approach. Friedman [7] studies the strategic properties of these methods
which we describe in the next paragraph and ￿nds out that these do enjoy nice
strategic properties similar to serial cost sharing in homogeneous goods case. He
￿nds out that the game induced by such methods is solvable by iterative elimi-
nation of overwhelmed strategies17 introduced in Friedman & Shenker [10]18.
This natural extension of the serial method (1) to the heterogeneous case,
where C(q) is an arbitrary non-decreasing and continuously di⁄erentiable func-
tion of its n variables, which was introduced in Friedman and Moulin [9], is de-
￿ned as follows. Consider a path19 ￿SC from 0 to q given by ￿SC(t;q) = (te)^q;
for t ￿ 0; where (p ^ q)i = minfpi;qig and e = (1;1;:::;1) is the unit vector in
RN. This path essentially follows the diagonal of the n-dimensional positive
orthant till its coordinates are smaller than all the coordinates of the demand
vector q. As soon as it meets the demand of some agent, it starts following
the projection of the diagonal in the hyperplane where that coordinate is ￿xed
at the demand in that coordinate and so on. Given such a path ￿SC the cost







Here, @iC(p) is the partial derivative of C with respect to pi evaluated at p:
It is clear from (2) that the path relevant to an agent is independent of higher
demands. Thus, the cost shares of agents are una⁄ected by small changes in the
demands of higher demanding agents. Therefore, the externality is one sided
(and thus, acyclic). Intuitively, due to this reason this mechanism enjoys nice
strategic properties that we will see in Theorem 1. Moreover, due the same
reason, the nice strategic properties are preserved if the ￿SC is replaced by
any arbitrary continuous non-decreasing path ￿(t;C) ^ q; where ￿ satis￿es the
following properties. For ￿xed C, ￿ is non-decreasing and continuous in t with
￿(0;C) = 0 and limt!1 ￿i(t;C) > qmax for all i. See ￿gure 3 below for an
example of such a ￿:
17A strategy si for agent i is overwhelmed by strategy ￿ si with respect to S￿i if the best that
agent i can get over S￿i by playing si is worse than the worst that he gets by playing ￿ si.
18Notice that this is stronger property than solvability in elimination of dominated strate-
gies.
19SC in the symbol underlines the point that this path corresponds to the generalization of










Figure 3: Fixed path method in two agent case
This liberty of choosing the ￿ gives rise to a huge class of cost sharing
methods called Fixed Path Methods (FPM). There is a FPM corresponding to






@iC(￿(t;C) ^ q)d(￿i(t;C) ^ qi) (3)
These are called ￿xed path methods because the path ￿; which does not
depend on q and thus, are in a sense ￿xed, uniquely de￿nes a method. One
example of a ￿xed path is the path which follows the the edges of the rectangle
[0:q] in some predecided order and this leads to the incremental methods. Notice
that when cost function is symmetric or when ￿ is independent of the cost
function then the only symmetric FPM is the Friedman-Moulin method (2)
de￿ned by the path which is the diagonal of the positive orthant. Leroux [18]
provides a justi￿cation of non-symmetric paths. However, symmetry is trivially
satis￿ed when the cost function is not symmetric and we allow ￿ to be a function
of C. This gives rise to a huge class of symmetric methods. Clearly, we will
be sacri￿cing additivity in most of the cases but we can recover scale invariance
11and even stronger properties like ordinality20 ( see Sprumont [28] ). The path
which most closely follows the spirit of serial method is the path which de￿nes
Moulin-Shenker ordinal method discussed in ( Sprumont [28] ). This path which
we will call ￿
MS is de￿ned by the solution of the following di⁄erential equation
d￿
MS
i (t;C)=dt = 1=@iC(￿
MS(t;C))
satisfying the boundary condition ￿
MS(0;C) = 0. This path has the property
that on any point on the path the incremental cost generated by a small move
along the path is shared equally among the agents not fully served. Other exam-
ples of FPMs can be generated by applying a FPM to any suitably normalized
problem e.g. applying FPM to axially normalized problem ( Friedman [7] ).
One seemingly natural FPM thus generated discussed in Friedman [7] is the use
of diagonal path after axial normalization of the problem.
Given the set of agents N; utility pro￿le u = fuigi2N, a cost function C, a
￿xed path method x￿(￿; ￿) induces a cost sharing game ￿(x;u) . These induced
games have variety of strategic properties: uniqueness of NE, Strong Equilibria,
uniqueness of set of rationalizable outcomes and convergence of adaptive learn-
ers. Friedman [7] shows these properties for ￿xed path methods by showing that
the induced games are O-Solvable which in turn implies all these properties.
Theorem 1 (Friedman [7]): Assume that the marginal cost (@iC(q)) is
strictly increasing in all variables, x
￿
i (￿; ￿) is a ￿xed path method and that pref-
erences, ui(qi;xi) are increasing in qi, decreasing in xi; and concave. Then the
induced game is O-solvable.
It should be noted that there can be paths which depends on q and we can use
such paths to de￿ne "path methods" in a similar fashion as (3). One prominent
example of such a path method is the Auman-Shapley method where the path
is the ray joining the origin to the demand vector, thus for each demand there
corresponds a path. More precisely, the path which generates the Aumann-
Shapley method is given by ￿
AS(t;C)(q) = tq. We notice that this path is not
a ￿xed path and the demand game generated by this method does not share
the appealing strategic properties that is enjoyed by the FPMs. The Aumann-
Shapley method in the homogeneous goods case is the proportional method.
It has been shown in Watts [30] (see also Moulin [20] for detailed analyses )
that uniqueness of NE is not guaranteed in the proportional demand games for
general convex preferences and a su¢ cient condition has been shown to be the
binormality of preferences. Moreover, as we will discuss in next section, even
when the NE is unique this method doesn￿ t share the strategic properties of
that of the FPMs. Intuitively, this happens because a change in the demand
by any agent changes the cost shares of all the agents. For more on such path
20Ordinality is a stronger requirement than scale invariance. Scale invariance requires that
the cost shares should be invariant to linear transformation of the demand pro￿le whereas
ordinality requires that it should be invariant to any arbitrary monotonic transformations,
possibily non linear.
12methods and axiomatic characterization of methods generated by paths and
more generally by convex combinations of paths please refer to Friedman and
Moulin [9].
4 Serial SCF and generalized serial SCF
We mentioned in the last section that if the production technology has increasing
marginal costs and the preferences are convex then the serial rule (1) de￿ned
in the homogeneous goods case induces a game which admits a unique NE. A
serial social choice function (SCF) for a ￿xed cost function C associates this
unique NE allocation to the preference pro￿le generating this game.




































Figure 4: Serial SCF in two agent case
Figure 4 above demonstrates the Serial mechanism (SCF) in two individual
and two good economy where one good x is the input (x-axis) and the other
good q is output (y-axis). The production technology is decreasing returns to
scale i.e. the cost function is convex. The blue curve is c(q), red one is c(2q)/2
and the black one coincides with the red one till point A and then goes parallel
to blue curve. More precisely, the black curve has two parts. The part below
A is the locus of points that are 1/2 of some point on the blue curve. The part
above A is the locus of points whose vector sum to the point A belongs to the
blue curve. The high valuation agent (H) is the agent whose MRS is higher for
the output with respect to the input. The other agent is the low valuation agent
(L). The agents are required to report their utility functions and allocation is
assigned according to the Serial cost sharing rule. More details on the algorithm
to implement the serial SCF can be found in Moulin and Shenker [22]. The
purpose of bringing the 2X2 case of Serial SCF here is that the Generalized
13Serial SCF is de￿ned very closely in the spirit of Serial mechanism here. The
three conditions below in the de￿nition of generalized serial functions are linked
to the following three observation in the above picture.
1) The opportunity set of L remains una⁄ected by change in the preferences
of H as long as H has higher valuation than L.
2) Owing to the convexity of production function and the preferences, there
is a unique maximizer point A for L on his opportunity set given H and also B
for H on her opportunity set given L.
3) Owing to no kinks in red and black curve at A, A remains the optimum
point for L even after small changes in preference by H.
Generalized Serial Mechanism (SCF):
The generalized serial SCF is de￿ned for an economy with n agents and
m goods where n and m are greater than 1. Production technology P is a
m ￿ p dimensional smooth manifold which represents a technology where out
of m-goods, p are inputs and m-p are outputs. Set of alternatives A is the
set of allocation to the agents in N which is feasible under P. More formally,
A ￿ fx 2 Rmn
+ j(
Pn
i=1 xi) 2 Pg. One example of such set of alternatives where
m = 2 and p = 1 is the set of allocations for the two agents in the above example
which add up the a point which lie on the blue curve in ￿gure 4. The set of
admissible utility functions Ui for agent i contains the functions ui : Rm ! R
that are continuous, non-decreasing in all dimensions, locally non satiated and
quasi-concave. Linear utilities of agent i is the subset L of Ui which isomorphic
to Rm
+ ￿ f0mg.
De￿nition 5 (Generalized Serial Function (Shenker) [26]) Consider a func-
tion a : Rn
+ ! A st., 8z 2 Rn
+ and 8￿ 2 L :
(1) zi ￿ zj ) ai(z) = ai(z￿j;sj);8sj 2 [zi;1];
(2)￿:ai(z￿i;si) has a unique maximizer si; 8i
(3)If si is the unique maximizer of ￿:ai(z￿i;si) then si is also the unique
maximizer of ￿:ai(z0
￿i;si) 8z0 st., 8j 6= i; MIN[z0
j;zj] < si ) z0
j = zj:
Such a function "a" is called a "generalized serial function"
Let￿ s denote by F the set of all generalized serial functions. For a given
utility pro￿le u a function a 2 F induces the normal form game ￿(a;u) ￿
hN; 8i; Si = R+;fui(ai(￿)gi2N)i where N is the set of players, R+ is the strat-
egy space for all players and the payo⁄function for player i is given by ui￿ai(￿).
Such games possesses unique NE.
Lemma1 : 8u 2 U;8a 2 F;￿(a;u) has a unique NE.
Proof: The proof consists of two steps. In ￿rst step it is shown that there
can not be more than one NE and then an explicit algorithm is given to construct
a NE. A formal proof can be found in Appendix A.1 below.
De￿nition 6 (Generalized Serial Mechanism) ￿
a is a generalized serial mech-
anism (GSS) associated with a 2 F if ￿
a(u) = a(z) where z is the unique NE of
￿(a;u):
14Let￿ s denote by G the set of all generalized serial mechanisms.
5 Secure implementability of Generalized Serial
Mechanisms and the ￿xed path mechanisms
Now we are ready to present our main result which encompasses the result of
Saijo et al. [25]
Theorem 2 : Any generalized serial mechanism (GSS) is securely imple-
mentable.
Proof: We show the secure implementabilty of GSS by showing that the
GSS are strategyproof and that they satisfy the rectangularity property. Then
by proposition 1 the desired result follows. Please refer to the Appendix A.2
below for a complete proof.
Now we de￿ne a class of social choice functions called ￿xed path social choice
functions based on ￿xed path cost sharing rules. Lets assume the conditions on
the cost function and the preferences that were used in theorem 1. Then from
the theorem 1 we know that there will be unique NE in the game ￿(x￿;u)
induced by the the cost sharing rule x￿ based on the ￿xed path ￿.




corresponding to the unique NE of the game ￿(x￿;u) to the preference pro￿le
u.
The following theorem states that all such ￿xed path SCF are securely im-
plementable.




is a special case of generalized serial social choice function and
thus are securely implementable.
Proof: The proof consists of explicitly constructing a generalized serial
function "a" for every ￿xed path social choice function ￿
x
￿
. We use two lemmas
for proving the desired properties of such "a". Please refer to Appendix A.3
below for a comprehensive proof.
At this time we would like to emphasize that the SCFs corresponding to path
methods other than ￿xed path methods may not be securely implementable.
One such method as we discussed above is the Aumann-Shapley method which
corresponds to the proportional method in the homogeneous goods case. To
ensure the uniqueness of NE in the demand game lets consider linear utilities
(which are obviously binormal) given by ui(qi;xi) = biqi ￿ xi and convex cost




qN c(qN), where qN =
P




associates to every utility pro￿le u the unique NE of the demand game ￿(xpr;u).
We notice that this SCF is not securely implementable. As a matter of fact
these are not even strategyproof. To see this consider a two agent situation.
Let the linear utilities of agents 1 and 2 be de￿ned by the parameters b1 and
15b2. Then, whenever bi￿ s are close enough to ensure the active participation of
both agents, the unique NE demand pro￿le (q￿
1;q￿





and the equilibrium cost shares turn out to be xi = 4
9(bi ￿
bj




i;j 2 f1;2g. Therefore, the optimal report ￿ b￿
i of agent i with true parameter bi




￿ bj where ￿ bj is the report of agent j. Clearly, there are
pro￿table manipulation of reports by agents. In particular, suppose b1 = b2 = b
and agent 1 reports truthfully then the optimal report of agent 2 is 11
4 b.
We see that the FPMs are special case of GSS. However, there are GSS
which can not be represented by FPM. One trivial example is a constant SCF.
Therefore we conclude that GSS are more general than FPMs and have nice
strategic properties..
We conclude by the following conjecture which we leave for future work.
Conjecture: Every smooth, nonconstant, anonymous and securely imple-
mentable scf is an element of G:
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of lemma 1
Step 1- Given any u 2 U and any a 2 F; ￿(a;u) can not have more than
one NE.









ig =) zj = z0
j:
Without loss of generality, say z0




zi which is a contradiction.
Step 2- Given any u 2 U and any a(z) 2 F; The following algorithm gener-











ig: Set z1 = s1
1 and leave the









ig: Set z2 = s2
2 and leave the
other elements of z unchanged.
6)Repeat the process to update z3;z4;:::::;zn.





i+1 for all i = 1,2,...n-1, then z is a NE.








2: This holds because, s2
1 = s1
1 = z1 (because 1 is solving the














Proof: Notice ￿rst that sk
l = zl = sl
l for all l < k. This is true because of






k+1 which contradicts the de￿nition
of sk
k . ￿
A.2 Proof of theorem 2
Strategyproofness of GSS follows from Theorem 7.2.3 in Dasgupta et al. [6],
given our domain of preferences being monotonically closed and the fact that
GSS is a single valued Nash Implementable SCF.
We will prove the Rectangularity Property:
8u; ~ u 2 U ; fui(￿
a(~ u)) = ui(￿
a(ui; ~ u￿i)) 8i 2 N =) ￿
a(~ u) = ￿
a(u)g
Proof:
Fix an arbitrary pair of utility pro￿les u; ~ u 2 U
Let ui(￿
a(~ u)) = ui(￿
a(ui; ~ u￿i)) 8i 2 N
De￿ne, NE(￿(a;ui; ~ u￿i)) = ~ zi; NE(￿(a; ~ u)) = ~ z ; NE(￿(a;u)) = z: (Notice
the notation; ~ zi is a vector and ~ zi is the i￿ th component of the vector ~ z. For
example, ~ zi
kis the k￿ th component of ~ zi.)
Step1: ~ zi = ~ z ; 8i 2 N:
Proof: Let ~ zi 6= ~ z for some i:
Now, we must have an element k st. ~ zi
k 6= ~ zkand minf~ zi
j; ~ zjg < minf~ zi
k; ~ zkg =)
~ zi
j = ~ zj:
Case1: k 6= i
Without loss of generality, say, ~ zi




~ uk(ak(s; ~ zi
￿k)) = argmax
s2[0;1]
~ uk(ak(s; ~ z￿k)) = ~ zkwhich is a
contradiction.
Case2: k = i
Here there are two relevant cases,
Case2.1: ~ zi









From property 1 in the de￿nition of a, we must have the following
ai(~ zi
i; ~ zi
￿i) = ai(~ zi
i; ~ z￿i)
or, ai(~ zi) = ai(~ zi
i; ~ z￿i)
=) ui(ai(~ zi)) = ui(ai(~ zi
i; ~ z￿i))
We also know, ui(￿
a(~ u)) = ui(￿
a(ui; ~ u￿i)) 8i 2 N
or, ui(a(~ z)) = ui(a(~ zi)); 8i 2 N:
or, ui(ai(~ z)) = ui(ai(~ zi)); 8i 2 N:
Therefore, ui(ai(~ z)) = ui(ai(~ zi
i; ~ z￿i))
In other words, ui(ai(~ zi; ~ z￿i)) = ui(ai(~ zi
i; ~ z￿i))
But then, ~ zi
i = ~ zi because ~ zi




i > ~ zi
From property 1 in the de￿nition of a, we must have the following
ai(~ zi; ~ z￿i) = ai(~ zi; ~ zi
￿i)
or, ai(~ z) = ai(~ zi; ~ zi
￿i)
=) ui(ai(~ z)) = ui(ai(~ zi; ~ zi
￿i))
We also know, ui(ai(~ z)) = ui(ai(~ zi)); 8i 2 N:
Therefore we have,
ui(ai(~ zi)) = ui(ai(~ zi; ~ zi
￿i))
But then, ~ zi
i = ~ zi because ~ zi




Notice, the above step establishes the following property :
~ ui(ai(s; ~ z￿i)) and ui(ai(s; ~ z￿i)) both are maximized at ~ zi = ~ zi
ifor all i ￿ ￿
Step 2:
￿
a(~ u) = ￿
a(u)
Proof:
Proving a(z) = a(~ z) should be enough since, by de￿nition ￿
a(~ u) = ￿
a(u)
() a(z) = a(~ z):
In fact, we will prove a stronger property, namely, z = ~ z:
Suppose not and let z 6= ~ z .
Now, we must have an element k st. zk 6= ~ zkand minfzj; ~ zjg < minfzk; ~ zkg =)
zj = ~ zj:
18There can be two cases,
Case 1. zk > ~ zk
Then we get the following expression, where ￿rst and fourth equalities are
from de￿nition, second follows from the ￿ and third is due to the property 3 in
the de￿nition of function "a"
~ zk = argmax
s2[0;1]
~ uk(ak(s; ~ z￿k)) = argmax
s2[0;1]
uk(ak(s; ~ z￿k)) = argmax
s2[0;1]
uk(ak(s;z￿k)) =
zk and we reach a contradiction.
Case 2. zk < ~ zk
Then we get the following expression, where ￿rst and fourth equalities are
from de￿nition, third follows from the ￿ and second is due to the property 3 in





uk(ak(s; ~ z￿k)) = argmax
s2[0;1]
~ uk(ak(s; ~ z￿k)) =
~ zk and we hit another contradiction to conclude the proof.
￿
A.3 Proof of theorem 3
We ￿rst present two lemmas which will be the key to the proof of theorem
3 below.
Lemma 2 ( Lemma 1 in Friedman [7] ): Assume that marginal cost is
strictly increasing in all variables and that x
￿
i (￿;￿) is a ￿xed path method. De￿ne
zi(qi) = min[tj￿i(t) ￿ qi]. Then:
(a) x
￿
i (q;C) is strictly increasing and strictly convex in qi:
(b) x
￿
i (q;C) is non decreasing in qj for all j 6= i.





i (q￿j; ￿ qj;C).
Lemma 3 (Lemma 2 in Moulin & Shenker [22] ): Let h1(￿);h2(￿) be
two increasing and strictly convex functions from R+ onto itself that coincide
up to ￿0:
h1(￿) = h2(￿) for all ￿; 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0
Then for every utility function ui in Ui, the (unique) maximizers of ui(hk(￿);￿)
on R+; denoted by ￿k, k = 1;2 are on the same side of ￿0:
￿1￿ ￿0 () ￿2￿ ￿0; ￿1= ￿0 () ￿2= ￿0.
Proof of theorem:
Fix a cost function C satisfying the assumptions of theorem 1. Let the do-
main of utility functions representing the preferences satisfying the assumptions
19be U: Let the the set of alternatives be A ￿ f(q;x) : q 2 [0;qmax]N;x 2 RN
+ and P




: U ! A which allocates the outcome corresponding to the
unique NE of ￿(x￿;u) to the preference pro￿le u. Consider Di = f0g[ft 2 R+j
￿
0
i(t)￿ is positiveg21 and zi(qi) = min[tj￿i(t) ￿ qi] (see ￿gure 3 above for such
an example of zi). We claim that a function a : ￿i2NDi ! A which is de￿ned





. Let ai(z) = (qi(z);x
￿
i (q(z))) for all i, where qi(z) = ￿i(zi) and
q(z) = (￿1(z1);￿2(z2);:::;￿n(zn)). We will now prove the following three prop-
erties of a using lemma 2 and lemma 3 above and the assumption on preferences.
8z 2 ￿i2NDi and 8￿ 2 L :
(1)zi ￿ zj ) ai(z) = ai(z￿j;sj);8sj 2 [zi;1];
(2)￿:ai(z￿i;si) has a unique maximizer si; 8i
(3)If si is the unique maximizer of ￿:ai(z￿i;si) then si is also the unique
maximizer of ￿:ai(z0
￿i;si) 8z0 st., 8j 6= i; MIN[z0
j;zj] < si ) z0
j = zj
First thing to notice is that even though the domain of "a" is not the same
as in the original de￿nition, the properties of "a" is retained exactly. This is so
because for all i, the Di is order-isomorphic to R+ given Di is concatenation
of open-closed intervals with "0" included. Now we will show the above three
properties one by one. To see that property 1 is true, notice that zi uniquely
de￿nes qi(z) = ￿i(zi) which is independent of z￿i. Also, part (c) of the lemma
1 implies that x
￿
i (q(z)) = x
￿
i (q(￿ z)) 8z0 st., 8j 6= i; MIN[z0
j;zj] < si ) z0
j = zj.
Property 2 is a consequence of part (a) of lemma 1 and the linearity of pref-
erences. We ￿rst notice that strict convexity of x
￿
i (q;C) in qi and linearity of
preferences which are increasing in qi and decreasing in xi ensures a unique
maximizer q￿
i . But then, there will a unique z￿
i for this q￿
i by the de￿nition of
zi. Property 3 is a bit more subtle and the proof is as follows. Consider two
points z and z0 in ￿i2NDi. Consider a coordinate i. Let, 8j 6= i; MIN[z0
j;zj] <
si ) z0
j = zj. Consider ￿ 2 fR+ ￿ R￿g=f0g. Let ￿ si = argmax
si2Di
￿:ai(z￿i;si)
and ~ si = argmax
si2Di
￿:ai(z0
￿i;si). Let￿ s call faj(z￿i; ￿ si)gj2N = f(￿ qj; ￿ xj)gj2N
and faj(z0
￿i; ~ si)gj2N = f(~ qj; ~ xj)gj2N. From part (c) of lemma 2 we know
x
￿
i (￿ q￿i;qi;C) & x
￿
i (~ q￿i;qi;C) coincide for all qi 2 [0; ￿ qi]. Also, we know from
part (b) of lemma 2 that x
￿
i (￿ q￿i;￿;C) & x
￿
i (~ q￿i;￿;C) both are strictly convex in
qi. By the de￿nition of ￿ si it follows that ￿ qi = argmax
qi2[0;qmax]
￿ ￿ (qi , x
￿
i (￿ q￿i;qi;C)).
But then from lemma 3 we must have ￿ qi = ~ qi. Finally to conclude the proof we








i(t)￿ is the left hand derivative of ￿i at t:
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